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The Nature of Consciousness - Perceptual, Representational or First Order - or are People as Confused as their Definitions of Conscious States?

23 November, 2015 - 09:07
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There are many different definitions and words describing consciousness and conscious states such as phenomenological consciousness (which is basically the experience of conscious objects or states). There are other terms that define consciousness as being merely first order or not representational or higher order and only being representational. By 'representational' I mean that an object or experience is only conscious when someone has a higher order perception, thought or representation about it in ones mind.

Maybe consciousness isn't really like anything anyway. If you think about it - if it can be argued that lesser animals like dogs and cats can be conscious - then what makes a human a human isn't really that big of a deal.

Lesser animals think and feel. They don't have a large vocabulary, but I might postulate that they feel colors and objects in a similar fashion as humans do. What makes a humans capacity for thought such a greater achievement?