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Section Fifty-four: “The Cosmological Idea”, Continued

25 September, 2015 - 17:33

This is the arrangement and solution of the whole antinomy, in which Reason finds itself involved, in the application of its principles to the sense-world, and of which even this (the mere arrangement) would be itself a considerable ser- vice to the knowledge of the human Reason, even though the solution of the conflict should not fully satisfy the reader, who has here a natural illusion to combat, which has only recently been presented to him as such, and which he has previously regarded as true. For one consequence of this is inevitable, namely, that seeing it is quite impossible to get free of this conflict of Reason with itself, so long as the objects of the sense-world are taken for things in themselves, and not for what they are in reality, namely, mere phenomena, the reader is necessitated thereby again to undertake the deduction of all our knowledge apriori, and its examination as given by me, in order to come to a decision in the matter. I do not require more [than this] at present; for if he has but first penetrated deeply enough into the nature of pure Reason, the conceptions by which the solution of this conflict of Reason is alone possible, will be already familiar to him, without which circumstance I cannot expect full credit even from the most attentive reader.

To think about: in some sense, Kant can be called a ‘compatibilist’: he thinks it’s at least possible that determinism and free will should co-exist. Is this any different from Hume’s compatibilism? If so, how?