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The Constitutional and Statutory Definitions of “Gross Income:” Realization

30 July, 2015 - 17:42

Can a taxpayer realize income if s/he never receives it, but someone else does?

Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940)

MR. JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.

The sole question for decision is whether the gift, during the donor’s taxable year, of interest coupons detached from the bonds, delivered to the donee and later in the year paid at maturity, is the realization of income taxable to the donor.

In 1934 and 1935, respondent, the owner of negotiable bonds, detached from them negotiable interest coupons shortly before their due date and delivered them as a gift to his son, who, in the same year, collected them at maturity. The Commissioner ruled that, under ... [§ 61], the interest payments were taxable, in the years when paid, to the respondent donor, who reported his income on the cash receipts basis. The circuit court of appeals reversed the order of the Board of Tax Appeals sustaining the tax. We granted certiorari because of the importance of the question in the administration of the revenue laws and because of an asserted conflict in principle of the decision below with that of Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, and with that of decisions by other circuit courts of appeals. SeeBishop v. Commissioner, 54 F.2d 298; Dickey v. Burnet, 56 F.2d 917, 921; Van Meter v. Commissioner, 61 F.2d 817.

The court below thought that, as the consideration for the coupons had passed to the obligor, the donor had, by the gift, parted with all control over them and their payment, and for that reason the case was distinguishable from Lucas v. Earl, supra, and Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136, where the assignment of compensation for services had preceded the rendition of the services, and where the income was held taxable to the donor.

The holder of a coupon bond is the owner of two independent and separable kinds of right. One is the right to demand and receive at maturity the principal amount of the bond representing capital investment. The other is the right to demand and receive interim payments of interest on the investment in the amounts and on the dates specified by the coupons. Together, they are an obligation to pay principal and interest given in exchange for money or property which was presumably the consideration for the obligation of the bond. Here respondent, as owner of the bonds, had acquired the legal right to demand payment at maturity of the interest specified by the coupons and the power to command its payment to others which constituted an economic gain to him.

Admittedly not all economic gain of the taxpayer is taxable income. From the beginning, the revenue laws have been interpreted as defining “realization” of income as the taxable event, rather than the acquisition of the right to receive it. And “realization” is not deemed to occur until the income is paid. But the decisions and regulations have consistently recognized that receipt in cash or property is not the only characteristic of realization of income to a taxpayer on the cash receipts basis. Where the taxpayer does not receive payment of income in money or property, realization may occur when the last step is taken by which he obtains the fruition of the economic gain which has already accrued to him. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716; Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378. Cf.Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670.

In the ordinary case the taxpayer who acquires the right to receive income is taxed when he receives it, regardless of the time when his right to receive payment accrued. But the rule that income is not taxable until realized has never been taken to mean that the taxpayer, even on the cash receipts basis, who has fully enjoyed the benefit of the economic gain represented by his right to receive income can escape taxation because he has not himself received payment of it from his obligor. The rule, founded on administrative convenience, is only one of postponement of the tax to the final event of enjoyment of the income, usually the receipt of it by the taxpayer, and not one of exemption from taxation where the enjoyment is consummated by some event other than the taxpayer’s personal receipt of money or property. [citation omitted] This may occur when he has made such use or disposition of his power to receive or control the income as to procure in its place other satisfactions which are of economic worth. The question here is whether, because one who in fact receives payment for services or interest payments is taxable only on his receipt of the payments, he can escape all tax by giving away his right to income in advance of payment. If the taxpayer procures payment directly to his creditors of the items of interest or earnings due him, seeOld Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, supra; [citations omitted], or if he sets up a revocable trust with income payable to the objects of his bounty, [citation omitted], [citations omitted], he does not escape taxation because he did not actually receive the money. [citations omitted]

Underlying the reasoning in these cases is the thought that income is “realized” by the assignor because he, who owns or controls the source of the income, also controls the disposition of that which he could have received himself and diverts the payment from himself to others as the means of procuring the satisfaction of his wants. The taxpayer has equally enjoyed the fruits of his labor or investment and obtained the satisfaction of his desires whether he collects and uses the income to procure those satisfactions or whether he disposes of his right to collect it as the means of procuring them. [citation omitted]

Although the donor here, by the transfer of the coupons, has precluded any possibility of his collecting them himself, he has nevertheless, by his act, procured payment of the interest, as a valuable gift to a member of his family. Such a use of his economic gain, the right to receive income, to procure a satisfaction which can be obtained only by the expenditure of money or property would seem to be the enjoyment of the income whether the satisfaction is the purchase of goods at the corner grocery, the payment of his debt there, or such nonmaterial satisfactions as may result from the payment of a campaign or community chest contribution, or a gift to his favorite son. Even though he never receives the money, he derives money’s worth from the disposition of the coupons which he has used as money or money’s worth in the procuring of a satisfaction which is procurable only by the expenditure of money or money’s worth. The enjoyment of the economic benefit accruing to him by virtue of his acquisition of the coupons is realized as completely as it would have been if he had collected the interest in dollars and expended them for any of the purposes named. [citation omitted]

In a real sense, he has enjoyed compensation for money loaned or services rendered, and not any the less so because it is his only reward for them. To say that one who has made a gift thus derived from interest or earnings paid to his donee has never enjoyed or realized the fruits of his investment or labor because he has assigned them instead of collecting them himself and then paying them over to the donee is to affront common understanding and to deny the facts of common experience. Common understanding and experience are the touchstones for the interpretation of the revenue laws.

The power to dispose of income is the equivalent of ownership of it. The exercise of that power to procure the payment of income to another is the enjoyment, and hence the realization, of the income by him who exercises it. We have had no difficulty in applying that proposition where the assignment preceded the rendition of the services, Lucas v. Earl, supra; Burnet v. Leininger, supra, for it was recognized in the Leininger case that, in such a case, the rendition of the service by the assignor was the means by which the income was controlled by the donor, and of making his assignment effective. But it is the assignment by which the disposition of income is controlled when the service precedes the assignment, and, in both cases, it is the exercise of the power of disposition of the interest or compensation, with the resulting payment to the donee, which is the enjoyment by the donor of income derived from them.


The dominant purpose of the revenue laws is the taxation of income to those who earn or otherwise create the right to receive it and enjoy the benefit of it when paid. SeeCorliss v. Bowers, supra, 281 U.S. 376, 378; Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 283. The tax laid by the 1934 Revenue Act upon income “derived from ... wages, or compensation for personal service, of whatever kind and in whatever form paid ... ; also from interest ...” therefore cannot fairly be interpreted as not applying to income derived from interest or compensation when he who is entitled to receive it makes use of his power to dispose of it in procuring satisfactions which he would otherwise procure only by the use of the money when received.

It is the statute which taxes the income to the donor although paid to his donee. Lucas v. Earl, supra; Burnet v. Leininger, supra. True, in those cases, the service which created the right to income followed the assignment, and it was arguable that, in point of legal theory, the right to the compensation vested instantaneously in the assignor when paid, although he never received it, while here, the right of the assignor to receive the income antedated the assignment which transferred the right, and thus precluded such an instantaneous vesting. But the statute affords no basis for such “attenuated subtleties.” The distinction was explicitly rejected as the basis of decision in Lucas v. Earl. It should be rejected here, for no more than in the Earl case can the purpose of the statute to tax the income to him who earns or creates and enjoys it be escaped by “anticipatory arrangements ... however skilfully devised” to prevent the income from vesting even for a second in the donor.

Nor is it perceived that there is any adequate basis for distinguishing between the gift of interest coupons here and a gift of salary or commissions. The owner of a negotiable bond and of the investment which it represents, if not the lender, stands in the place of the lender. When, by the gift of the coupons, he has separated his right to interest payments from his investment and procured the payment of the interest to his donee, he has enjoyed the economic benefits of the income in the same manner and to the same extent as though the transfer were of earnings, and, in both cases, the import of the statute is that the fruit is not to be attributed to a different tree from that on which it grew. SeeLucas v. Earl, supra, 281 U.S. at 115.


The separate opinion of MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS.


The unmatured coupons given to the son were independent negotiable instruments, complete in themselves. Through the gift, they became at once the absolute property of the donee, free from the donor’s control and in no way dependent upon ownership of the bonds. No question of actual fraud or purpose to defraud the revenue is presented.


... The challenged judgment should be affirmed.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS concur in this opinion.

Notes and Questions:

  1. Under the rules of § 102, donors make gifts with after-tax income, and the donee may exclude the value of the gift from his/her gross income. Taxpayer Horst of course tried to reverse this.
  2. No doubt, taxpayer’s son was in a lower tax bracket than taxpayer was. Hence, the dividends would have been subject to a lower rate of tax if taxpayer had prevailed.
  3. Consumption can take the form of directing income to another.
  4. The Internal Revenue Code taxes “taxable income,” §§ 1(a-e). The computation of “taxable income” begins with a summing up of all items of “gross income.” The concept of “gross income” does not inherently embody a netting of gains and losses. A taxpayer may deduct losses only to the extent that the Code permits. 1 Sections 165(a and c) allow taxpayers to deduct trade or business losses and investment losses. A realization requirement applies to deductions, just as it does to gross income. To be deductible, taxpayer must have “realized” the losses. Now read Cottage Savings Association.

Cottage Savings Ass’n v. CIR, 499 U.S. 554 (1991)

JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

The issue in this case is whether a financial institution realizes tax-deductible losses when it exchanges its interests in one group of residential mortgage loans for another lender’s interests in a different group of residential mortgage loans. We hold that such a transaction does give rise to realized losses.


Petitioner Cottage Savings Association (Cottage Savings) is a savings and loan association (S & L) formerly regulated by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). [footnote omitted] Like many S & L’s, Cottage Savings held numerous long-term, low-interest mortgages that declined in value when interest rates surged in the late 1970's. These institutions would have benefited from selling their devalued mortgages in order to realize tax-deductible losses. However, they were deterred from doing so by FHLBB accounting regulations, which required them to record the losses on their books. Reporting these losses consistent with the then-effective FHLBB accounting regulations would have placed many S & L’s at risk of closure by the FHLBB.

The FHLBB responded to this situation by relaxing its requirements for the reporting of losses. In a regulatory directive known as “Memorandum R-49,” dated June 27, 1980, the FHLBB determined that S & L’s need not report losses associated with mortgages that are exchanged for “substantially identical” mortgages held by other lenders. 2 The FHLBB’s acknowledged purpose for Memorandum R-49 was to facilitate transactions that would generate tax losses but that would not substantially affect the economic position of the transacting S & L’s.

This case involves a typical Memorandum R-49 transaction. On December 31, 1980, Cottage Savings sold “90% participation” in 252 mortgages to four S & L’s. It simultaneously purchased “90% participation interests” in 305 mortgages held by these S & L’s. 3 All of the loans involved in the transaction were secured by single-family homes, most in the Cincinnati area. The fair market value of the package of participation interests exchanged by each side was approximately $4.5 million. The face value of the participation interests Cottage Savings relinquished in the transaction was approximately $6.9 million.

On its 1980 federal income tax return, Cottage Savings claimed a deduction for $2,447,091, which represented the adjusted difference between the face value of the participation interests that it traded and the fair market value of the participation interests that it received. As permitted by Memorandum R-49, Cottage Savings did not report these losses to the FHLBB. After the Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed Cottage Savings’ claimed deduction, Cottage Savings sought a redetermination in the Tax Court. The Tax Court held that the deduction was permissible.

On appeal by the Commissioner, the Court of Appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals agreed with the Tax Court’s determination that Cottage Savings had realized its losses through the transaction. However, the court held that Cottage Savings was not entitled to a deduction because its losses were not “actually” sustained during the 1980 tax year for purposes of 26 U.S.C. § 165(a).

Because of the importance of this issue to the S & L industry and the conflict among the Circuits over whether Memorandum R-49 exchanges produce deductible tax losses, [footnote omitted] we granted certiorari. We now reverse.


Rather than assessing tax liability on the basis of annual fluctuations in the value of a taxpayer’s property, the Internal Revenue Code defers the tax consequences of a gain or loss in property value until the taxpayer “realizes” the gain or loss. The realization requirement is implicit in § 1001(a) of the Code, 26 U.S.C. § 1001(a), which defines “[t]he gain [or loss] from the sale or other disposition of property” as the difference between “the amount realized” from the sale or disposition of the property and its “adjusted basis.” As this Court has recognized, the concept of realization is “founded on administrative convenience.” Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116 (1940). Under an appreciation-based system of taxation, taxpayers and the Commissioner would have to undertake the “cumbersome, abrasive, and unpredictable administrative task” of valuing assets on an annual basis to determine whether the assets had appreciated or depreciated in value. [citation omitted]. In contrast, “[a] change in the form or extent of an investment is easily detected by a taxpayer or an administrative officer.” R. Magill, Taxable Income 79 (rev. ed.1945).

Section 1001(a)’s language provides a straightforward test for realization: to realize a gain or loss in the value of property, the taxpayer must engage in a “sale or other disposition of [the] property.” The parties agree that the exchange of participation interests in this case cannot be characterized as a “sale” under § 1001(a); the issue before us is whether the transaction constitutes a “disposition of property.” The Commissioner argues that an exchange of property can be treated as a “disposition” under § 1001(a) only if the properties exchanged are materially different. The Commissioner further submits that, because the underlying mortgages were essentially economic substitutes, the participation interests exchanged by Cottage Savings were not materially different from those received from the other S & L’s. Cottage Savings, on the other hand, maintains that any exchange of property is a “disposition of property” under § 1001(a), regardless of whether the property exchanged is materially different. Alternatively, Cottage Savings contends that the participation interests exchanged were materially different because the underlying loans were secured by different properties.

We must therefore determine whether the realization principle in § 1001(a) incorporates a “material difference” requirement. If it does, we must further decide what that requirement amounts to and how it applies in this case. We consider these questions in turn.


Neither the language nor the history of the Code indicates whether and to what extent property exchanged must differ to count as a “disposition of property” under § 1001(a). Nonetheless, we readily agree with the Commissioner that an exchange of property gives rise to a realization event under § 1001(a) only if the properties exchanged are “materially different.” The Commissioner himself has, by regulation, construed § 1001(a) to embody a material difference requirement:

Except as otherwise provided ... the gain or loss realized from the conversion of property into cash, or from the exchange of property for other property differing materially either in kind or in extent, is treated as income or as loss sustained.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1, 26 CFR § 1.1001-1 (1990) (emphasis added).

Because Congress has delegated to the Commissioner the power to promulgate “all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of [the Internal Revenue Code],” 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a), we must defer to his regulatory interpretations of the Code so long as they are reasonable, see National Muffler Dealers Assn., Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 476-477 (1979).

We conclude that Treasury Regulation § 1.1001-1 is a reasonable interpretation of § 1001(a). Congress first employed the language that now comprises § 1001(a) of the Code in § 202(a) of the Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, 43 Stat. 253; that language has remained essentially unchanged through various reenactments. [footnote omitted] And since 1934, the Commissioner has construed the statutory term “disposition of property” to include a “material difference” requirement. [footnote omitted] As we have recognized, “‘Treasury regulations and interpretations long continued without substantial change, applying to unamended or substantially reenacted statutes, are deemed to have received congressional approval and have the effect of law.’” United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 305-306 (1967), quoting Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938).

Treasury Regulation § 1.1001-1 is also consistent with our landmark precedents on realization. In a series of early decisions involving the tax effects of property exchanges, this Court made clear that a taxpayer realizes taxable income only if the properties exchanged are “materially” or “essentially” different. SeeUnited States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 173 (1921); Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242, 253-254 (1924); Marr v. United States, 268 U.S. 536, 540-542 (1925); see alsoEisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207-212 (1920) (recognizing realization requirement). Because these decisions were part of the “contemporary legal context” in which Congress enacted § 202(a) of the 1924 Act, [citation omitted], and because Congress has left undisturbed through subsequent reenactments of the Code the principles of realization established in these cases, we may presume that Congress intended to codify these principles in § 1001(a) [citations omitted]. The Commissioner’s construction of the statutory language to incorporate these principles certainly was reasonable.


Precisely what constitutes a “material difference” for purposes of § 1001(a) of the Code is a more complicated question. The Commissioner argues that properties are “materially different” only if they differ in economic substance. To determine whether the participation interests exchanged in this case were “materially different” in this sense, the Commissioner argues, we should look to the attitudes of the parties, the evaluation of the interests by the secondary mortgage market, and the views of the FHLBB. We conclude that § 1001(a) embodies a much less demanding and less complex test.

Unlike the question whether § 1001(a) contains a material difference requirement, the question of what constitutes a material difference is not one on which we can defer to the Commissioner. For the Commissioner has not issued an authoritative, prelitigation interpretation of what property exchanges satisfy this requirement. [footnote omitted] Thus, to give meaning to the material difference test, we must look to the case law from which the test derives and which we believe Congress intended to codify in enacting and reenacting the language that now comprises § 1001(a). [citation omitted].

We start with the classic treatment of realization in Eisner v. Macomber, supra. In Macomber, a taxpayer who owned 2,200 shares of stock in a company received another 1,100 shares from the company as part of a pro rata stock dividend meant to reflect the company’s growth in value. At issue was whether the stock dividend constituted taxable income. We held that it did not, because no gain was realized. We reasoned that the stock dividend merely reflected the increased worth of the taxpayer’s stock, and that a taxpayer realizes increased worth of property only by receiving “something of exchangeable value proceeding from the property,” see 252 U.S. at 207.

In three subsequent decisions – United States v. Phellis, supra; Weiss v. Stearn, supra; and Marr v. United States, supra – we refined Macomber’s conception of realization in the context of property exchanges. In each case, the taxpayer owned stock that had appreciated in value since its acquisition. And in each case, the corporation in which the taxpayer held stock had reorganized into a new corporation, with the new corporation assuming the business of the old corporation. While the corporations in Phellis and Marr both changed from New Jersey to Delaware corporations, the original and successor corporations in Weiss both were incorporated in Ohio. In each case, following the reorganization, the stockholders of the old corporation received shares in the new corporation equal to their proportional interest in the old corporation.

The question in these cases was whether the taxpayers realized the accumulated gain in their shares in the old corporation when they received in return for those shares stock representing an equivalent proportional interest in the new corporations. In Phellis and Marr, we held that the transactions were realization events. We reasoned that, because a company incorporated in one State has “different rights and powers” from one incorporated in a different State, the taxpayers in Phellis and Marr acquired through the transactions property that was “materially different” from what they previously had. United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. at 169-173; seeMarr v. United States, supra, 268 U.S. at 540-542 (using phrase “essentially different”). In contrast, we held that no realization occurred in Weiss. By exchanging stock in the predecessor corporation for stock in the newly reorganized corporation, the taxpayer did not receive “a thing really different from what he theretofore had.” Weiss v. Stearn, supra. As we explained in Marr, our determination that the reorganized company in Weiss was not “really different” from its predecessor turned on the fact that both companies were incorporated in the same State. SeeMarr v. United States, supra, 268 U.S. at 540-542 (outlining distinction between these cases).

Obviously, the distinction in Phellis and Marr that made the stock in the successor corporations materially different from the stock in the predecessors was minimal. Taken together, Phellis, Marr, and Weiss stand for the principle that properties are “different” in the sense that is “material” to the Internal Revenue Code so long as their respective possessors enjoy legal entitlements that are different in kind or extent. Thus, separate groups of stock are not materially different if they confer “the same proportional interest of the same character in the same corporation.” Marr v. United States, 268 U.S. at 540. However, they are materially different if they are issued by different corporations, id. at 541; United States v. Phellis, supra, 257 U.S. at 173, or if they confer “differen[t] rights and powers” in the same corporation, Marr v. United States, supra, 268 U.S. at 541. No more demanding a standard than this is necessary in order to satisfy the administrative purposes underlying the realization requirement in § 1001(a). SeeHelvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. at 116. For, as long as the property entitlements are not identical, their exchange will allow both the Commissioner and the transacting taxpayer easily to fix the appreciated or depreciated values of the property relative to their tax bases.

In contrast, we find no support for the Commissioner’s “economic substitute” conception of material difference. According to the Commissioner, differences between properties are material for purposes of the Code only when it can be said that the parties, the relevant market (in this case the secondary mortgage market), and the relevant regulatory body (in this case the FHLBB) would consider them material. Nothing in Phellis, Weiss, and Marr suggests that exchanges of properties must satisfy such a subjective test to trigger realization of a gain or loss.

Moreover, the complexity of the Commissioner’s approach ill-serves the goal of administrative convenience that underlies the realization requirement. In order to apply the Commissioner’s test in a principled fashion, the Commissioner and the taxpayer must identify the relevant market, establish whether there is a regulatory agency whose views should be taken into account, and then assess how the relevant market participants and the agency would view the transaction. The Commissioner’s failure to explain how these inquiries should be conducted further calls into question the workability of his test.

Finally, the Commissioner’s test is incompatible with the structure of the Code. Section 1001(c) ... provides that a gain or loss realized under § 1001(a) “shall be recognized” unless one of the Code’s nonrecognition provisions applies. One such nonrecognition provision withholds recognition of a gain or loss realized from an exchange of properties that would appear to be economic substitutes under the Commissioner’s material difference test. This provision, commonly known as the “like kind” exception, withholds recognition of a gain or loss realized

on the exchange of property held for productive use in a trade or business or for investment ... for property of like kind which is to be held either for productive use in a trade or business or for investment.
26 U.S.C. § 1031(a)(1).

If Congress had expected that exchanges of similar properties would not count as realization events under § 1001(a), it would have had no reason to bar recognition of a gain or loss realized from these transactions.


Under our interpretation of § 1001(a), an exchange of property gives rise to a realization event so long as the exchanged properties are “materially different” – that is, so long as they embody legally distinct entitlements. Cottage Savings’ transactions at issue here easily satisfy this test. Because the participation interests exchanged by Cottage Savings and the other S & L’s derived from loans that were made to different obligors and secured by different homes, the exchanged interests did embody legally distinct entitlements. Consequently, we conclude that Cottage Savings realized its losses at the point of the exchange.

The Commissioner contends that it is anomalous to treat mortgages deemed to be “substantially identical” by the FHLBB as “materially different.” The anomaly, however, is merely semantic; mortgages can be substantially identical for Memorandum R-49 purposes and still exhibit “differences” that are “material” for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code. Because Cottage Savings received entitlements different from those it gave up, the exchange put both Cottage Savings and the Commissioner in a position to determine the change in the value of Cottage Savings’ mortgages relative to their tax bases. Thus, there is no reason not to treat the exchange of these interests as a realization event, regardless of the status of the mortgages under the criteria of Memorandum R-49.


Although the Court of Appeals found that Cottage Savings’ losses were realized, it disallowed them on the ground that they were not sustained under § 165(a) of the Code, 26 U.S.C. § 165(a). ...

The Commissioner offers a minimal defense of the Court of Appeals’ conclusion. ...

... In view of the Commissioner’s failure to advance any other arguments in support of the Court of Appeals’ ruling with respect to § 165(a), we conclude that, for purposes of this case, Cottage Savings sustained its losses within the meaning of § 165(a).

For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Consistency between tax and financial accounting

The FHLBB obviously intended Memorandum R-49 to enable savings and loan associations to reduce their income tax liability and thereby come closer to solvency. Of course this effort came at the expense of all other taxpayers who must “pick up the slack.”

  • Income tax rules often require taxpayers to maintain consistent positions with regard to financial accounting and tax accounting. On the authority of the FHLBB – not Congress or the IRS – the savings and loan associations could treat dud loans completely differently for financial accounting and tax accounting purposes.

So ordered.

JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE WHITE joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part – omitted.

Notes and Questions:

  1. As a practical matter, what was wrong with the Commissioner’s arguments?
  2. What is the test of “realization” that the Court derived from Phellis/Weiss/Marr?
  3. In considering its earlier constructions of the “realization” requirement (part IIB of the opinion) in Macomber/Phellis/Weiss/Marr, the Court never mentioned the Sixteenth Amendment. Moreover, the Court stated in part IIB that administrative purposes underlie the “realization requirement.” By this time – if not earlier – the Court had de-constitutionalized the “realization” requirement – a matter that is critical to the Subpart F rules governing U.S. taxation of foreign source income.
  4. The Court’s application of the realization requirement would seem to give taxpayers considerable control over the timing of tax gains and losses.