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Part One, Section Forty-one

29 September, 2015 - 11:36

Secondly, it will be objected that there is a great difference betwixt real fire for instance, and the idea of fire, betwixt dreaming or imagining oneself burnt, and actually being so: if you suspect it to be only the idea of fire which you see, do but put your hand into it and you will be convinced with a witness. This and the like may be urged in opposition to our tenets. To all which the answer is evident from what hath been already said; and I shall only add in this place, that if real fire be very different from the idea of fire, so also is the real pain that it occasions very different from the idea of the same pain, and yet nobody will pretend that real pain either is, or can possibly be, in an unperceiving thing, or without the mind, any more than its idea.

  1. What is the second objection (Part One, Section Forty-one) Berkeley entertains? Berkeley says that ‘the answer is evident from what hath been already said.’ What answer can you construct for him, based on the earlier sections of the Principles?