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State versus Federal Regulation of Takeovers

15 January, 2016 - 09:38

Under the federal Williams Act, upon commencement of a tender offer for more than 5 percent of the target’s stock, the offeror must file a statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) stating the source of funds to be used in making the purchase, the purpose of the purchase, and the extent of its holdings in the target company. Even when a tender offer has not been made, the Williams Act requires any person who acquires more than 5 percent ownership of a corporation to file a statement with the SEC within ten days. The Williams Act, which made certain amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, can be viewed at http://taft.law.uc.edu/CCL/34Act/. The US Constitution is also implicated in the regulation of foreign corporations. The Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution provides that Congress has power “to regulate Commerce…among the several States.”

Because officers and directors of target companies have no legal say in whether stockholders will tender their shares, many states began, in the early 1970s, to enact takeover laws. The first generation of these laws acted as delaying devices by imposing lengthy waiting periods before a tender offer could be put into effect. Many of the laws expressly gave management of the target companies a right to a hearing, which could be dragged out for weeks or months, giving the target time to build up a defense. The political premise of the laws was the protection of incumbent managers from takeover by out-of-state corporations, although the “localness” of some managers was but a polite fiction. One such law was enacted in Illinois. It required notifying the Illinois secretary of state and the target corporation of the intent to make a tender offer twenty days prior to the offer. During that time, the corporation seeking to make the tender offer could not spread information about the offer. Finally, the secretary of state could delay the tender offer by ordering a hearing and could even deny the offer if it was deemed inequitable. In 1982, the Supreme Court, in Edgar v. Mite Corp., struck down the Illinois takeover law because it violated the Commerce Clause, which prohibits states from unduly burdening the flow of interstate commerce, and also was preempted by the Williams Act. 1

Following the Mite decision, states began to enact a second generation of takeover laws. In 1987, in CTS Corporation v. Dynamics Corporation of America, the Supreme Court upheld an Indiana second-generation statute that prevents an offeror who has acquired 20 percent or more of a target’s stock from voting unless other shareholders (not including management) approve. The vote to approve can be delayed for up to fifty days from the date the offeror files a statement reporting the acquisition. The Court concluded that the Commerce Clause was not violated nor was the Williams Act, because the Indiana law, unlike the Illinois law in Mite, was consistent with the Williams Act, since it protects shareholders, does not unreasonably delay the tender offer, and does not discriminate against interstate commerce. 2

Emboldened by the CTS decision, almost half the states have adopted a third-generation law that requires a bidder to wait several years before merging with the target company unless the target’s board agrees in advance to the merger. Because in many cases a merger is the reason for the bid, these laws are especially powerful. In 1989, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Wisconsin’s third-generation law, saying that it did not violate the Commerce Clause and that it was not preempted by the Williams Act. The Supreme Court decided not to review the decision. 3